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The microbiologic safety of food has been
advanced substantially by the introduction and
implementation of Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Points (HACCP). HACCP provides a
systematic conceptual framework for identifying
hazards and focusing efforts on the proper
functioning of key food production, processing,
and marketing steps. When applied appropri-
ately, HACCP is a cost-effective means of
controlling known hazards in foods. Its success-
ful implementation depends on knowledge of
such issues as the pathogenic microorganisms’
virulence, cultural characteristics, ways in which
they contaminate the food, effects of food
processing and preparation on their survival, and
food consumption patterns. Because it requires
substantial knowledge, HACCP cannot be
expected to control unknown hazards, such as
emerging foodborne pathogens. Therefore, con-
trolling a new foodborne microbial threat
requires moving the hazard as quickly as possible
from being unknown to being known. The key to
this transition is the timely acquisition of needed
research data. This article identifies classes of
research information needed and discusses a
conceptual approach for addressing unknown
microbial threats.
Anticipating the Next Emerging Pathogen
Two types of emergence are encountered with
pathogenic foodborne microorganisms. A true
emergence, where a microorganism that had not
been identified as a public health threat begins to
cause disease, is relatively rare. More common is
reemergence, where a known microorganism
causes disease in a new way, for example, by
causing new types of infections, being associated
with new foods, or appearing in new geographic
locations. For both types, the operational
requirement is to control an unanticipated public
health threat. The timeliness of response is critical
since the public health and economic costs of an
emerging pathogen are directly related to the time
between its emergence and its control.
The events that lead to emergence are often
complex, with the cause often being obscure and
only indirectly related to the new agent. Past
emergence of foodborne pathogens has been
associated with changes in microbial genotypes,
demographics, food production and processing
methods, marketing and preparation practices,
medical diagnostics, globalization of the food
industry, changes in consumer education, and
general socioeconomic trends (1-3). Planning for
a microbial threat is a challenge because one does
not know what the agent will be, what food it will
be associated with, or where or when emergence
will occur. While there are several potential ways
of anticipating and responding to microbial
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threats, the contingency planning used by the
military to anticipate threats seems well suited
for emerging pathogens. Military contingency
planning can be viewed as having four major
components: intelligence, personnel and facili-
ties, rapid response, and strategic planning.
Intelligence is the gathering of medical,
scientific, and other information that allows
emergence to be identified. In the United States,
this role is filled to a great extent by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In
addition to providing information on known
foodborne pathogens, CDC works with local
public health agencies and the medical and
scientific communities to investigate new disease
syndromes and identify unrecognized foodborne
pathogens. This type of intelligence gathering
played a pivotal role in the recent recognition of
Cyclospora as a cause of foodborne gastroenteri-
tis. CDC’s new sentinel site program, FoodNet, is
expected to greatly enhance the identification of
new foodborne diseases. However, these surveil-
lance activities are largely limited to the United
States, whereas an effective intelligence system
for foodborne disease must be worldwide. For
example, Cyclospora was identified as a likely
foodborne or waterborne pathogen in Asia and
South America before an outbreak was reported
in the United States.  Intelligence related to
foodborne disease can be acquired from several
sources: the World Health Organization’s
surveillance program, the U.S. military’s inter-
national network of laboratory and medical
investigators, medical and scientific reports, and
the Internet. The Internet is increasingly an
important source of intelligence related to
emerging pathogens; through news groups and
bulletin boards such as ProMed, scientists and
public health practitioners share their experi-
ences on almost a real-time basis. Such advances
in intelligence gathering are critical to reducing
the time between emergence and control.
However, limiting intelligence to medical
considerations is not enough: intelligence
gathering must include awareness of changes
and advances in food production methods,
agricultural practices and conditions, veterinary
medicine, environmental and water microbiol-
ogy, food technologies, consumer trends, and
general socioeconomic conditions.
The second component of contingency
planning is ensuring sufficient personnel and
facilities to characterize a new biologic agent and
develop control strategies. The inability to
predict the agent or the associated food, coupled
with the degree of specialization required of
investigators, requires a broad range of
capabilities and resources. However, no one
organization is likely to maintain the capabilities
needed to deal with all contingencies. If we were
to follow the military pattern, we would have
reserve groups that could be mobilized as needed.
However, even this approach requires planning
and support to ensure the needed expertise and
facilities. For example, the number of research-
ers and laboratories studying Clostridium
botulinum has dropped to a point where it would
be difficult to rapidly mobilize a research team,
despite this pathogen’s history of reemerging in a
surprisingly wide range of foods.
Rapid mobilization of resources is the third
component. This component is particularly
important for free-living infectious agents
because one goal is to limit their dissemination to
prevent them from establishing secondary
reservoirs. It is much easier to fight a small,
contained war than a global one. The mobiliza-
tion of resources to respond to an emergence
must be appropriate to the severity of the threat.
Overreacting hurts the credibility of the entire
system, while underreacting increases both the
public health and economic impact. Rapid
response efforts have focused at identifying
new agents and removing suspect food from the
marketplace, two key initial steps. However,
research to prevent another occurrence of the
emerging pathogen has been much less
organized and timely.
The fourth component of contingency plan-
ning, strategic planning, is actually the first
chronologically. This is the phase where
members of war colleges pose “what we would do
if” scenarios and plan appropriate responses.
This type of contingency planning has generally
received attention in relation to emerging
pathogens only in connection with the use of
biologic warfare agents. This process relies on
futurist thinking to consider how changes in
society, economics, technology, agriculture,
medicine, and international trade may affect the
microbiologic safety of the food supply. Such a
broad view is needed because more general
events or trends in society cause most disease
emergence. This type of strategic planning is
undertaken with the realization that the
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low, but the probability that one scenario will
materialize is extremely high.
Research Needs
Research, an integral part of responding to a
new foodborne microbial threat, is the key for
moving a new or reemerging biologic agent from
being an unknown pathogen to being one for
which control measures are available. Two areas
of research can be classified on the basis of time
constraints. Acute research needs are deficien-
cies in knowledge that must be addressed to
establish control of an emerging pathogen. This
research is highly targeted and specific for the
microorganism and food of concern; it must be
accomplished as quickly as possible. Acute
needs generally require applied research,
although basic research may have to be
conducted if the deficiencies in knowledge are
great. The second class encompasses longer-
term basic and applied research needs not
mandatory to immediate control.
Acute Needs
While the data needed for any single
emerging biologic agent are highly specific, acute
research needs fall into general categories that
are virtually the same for all new pathogens.
Common research questions include the follow-
ing: Are methods available for detecting and
categorizing  the agent? What food is the vehicle
for the pathogen? How do the implicated foods
become contaminated? What is the pathogen’s
reservoir in nature? Is the pathogen’s presence in
contaminated food the result of an error or
breakdown in normal controls? Does the
pathogen grow in foods? Does the pathogen
survive normal food processing, distribution, and
preparation? How infectious/toxigenic is the
pathogen? Are there subpopulations of consum-
ers at increased risk for this pathogen? Is the
pathogen’s ability to cause disease restricted to
specific strains with identifiable virulence
characteristics? Answering these questions
requires specific data that do not differ
substantially from pathogen to pathogen (Table).
The criteria for classifying needs as acute are
reasonably straightforward: Is the research
needed to prevent a recurrence of the disease or
to modify current HACCP plans? However, these
questions have different priorities, which depend
on when the information is needed. To deal with
emerging pathogens, we should learn from
modern business practices, especially the concept
of “just-in-time” research. Little consideration
has been given to how to assess and set research
priorities for emerging foodborne pathogens. One
attempt was provided as an appendix of the U.S.
Pathogen Reduction Task Force. A relatively
simple decision tree used a series of questions to
Table. Research data needed for most emerging
foodborne pathogens
Research area Knowledge gaps
Detection Sampling and enrichment
methods techniques
Cultivating
Biochemical/taxonomic char.
Antibodies for capture and
differentiation
Subtyping
Virulence-associated
char.
Detecting injured or viable-
but-nonculturable cells
Microbial Contaminated foods
ecology Reservoirs and routes of
transmission
Life cycles
Geogr. range and seasonality
Route of contamination and
location of pathogen in food
Pathogenicity Dis. char. and diagnosis
Sequelae
Host range
Infectious dose
Subpopulations at risk
Animal models
Growth Free-living vs. obligate
characteristics parasite
Growth requirements
Temperature
pH
Water activity
Oxygen
Survival Heat  resistance
characteristics D-values
Z-values
Susceptibility to anti-
microbial food additives
Acid resistance
Sensitivity to disinfectants
or dessication
Sensitivity to radiation
UV
Ionizing
Control Effectiveness of food
preservation
Inspection systems to segregate
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identify what research was the limiting step in
responding to the foodborne pathogen (4).
The timeliness of addressing research needs
must be an integral part of the planning process,
but has been generally overlooked. Past research
mobilization efforts for new foodborne microbial
threats can be best described as haphazard,
likely because they reflect the way research is
funded. The traditional means of ensuring strong
research programs, competitive funding of
projects after proposals have undergone exten-
sive peer review, is time consuming and often not
appropriate for the acute phase of responding to
an emerging foodborne pathogen. Further, the
peer-review process tends not to select the often
mundane research needed during the acute
phase of an emergence. Two alternative
approaches may be more effective. The first is to
have a series of designated laboratories that have
as part of their mission and funding the task of
being able to modify their research programs to
address acute research needs. Such laboratories
would need to have a critical mass of facilities
and expertise in various aspects of food safety
microbiology. The second approach is to have a
group of reserve scientists with unique expertise
or access to facilities not available at the
designated laboratories or needed to supplement
those capabilities. Funds could be earmarked to
noncompetitively fund such reserve scientists on
an as-needed basis, with the understanding that
research needs designated as acute would take
precedence over other research needs.
Longer-Term Needs
The three areas of longer-term research
associated with emerging pathogens are ame-
nable to more traditional funding. The first area,
specific to the new pathogen, consists of research
for improvements or alternatives to the detection
and control methods initially devised. With
initial disease control established, basic and
applied research can seek to understand the
microorganism and develop more optimal
approaches for its prevention, control, or
elimination. The second area concerns activities
to help reduce the time between the emergence of
a pathogen and its initial control (e.g., improved
surveillance through the development of new
diagnostic methods and further identification
and characterization of virulence determinants
and modes of pathogenicity to accelerate
detection of new agents). Just as important as
acquiring research data is rapid data dissemina-
tion. The continuing development of computer-
based information networks is a component of
this second research area.
The third area focuses on identifying
research factors that will allow new microbial
threats to be anticipated. Of necessity, the
current response to emerging pathogens is
almost entirely reactive. The public health
community detects a new syndrome, and only
then is research mobilized, often during a crisis.
While reactive response will always be part of
dealing with emerging microbial threats, a more
proactive approach is needed if prevention is to
be even partially realized. In military terms, war
is the last resort and represents the failure of
diplomats to predict and prevent a crisis.
Microbial threats, like wars, do not spontane-
ously emerge but are the result of a series of
events or conditions. There is a need to
reexamine how food is produced, processed,
marketed, and prepared to identify conditions
that contribute to emergence. For example,
organic acids are used extensively throughout
the food industry to control spoilage and
pathogenic microorganisms. Archer (5) hypoth-
esized that over time, exposure to pH conditions
that stress but do not kill may lead to the
emergence of hardier and possibly more virulent
foodborne pathogens. It is already well estab-
lished that the induction of acid tolerance can
enhance both the survival and virulence of
foodborne pathogens (6). Further, one of the basic
tenets of microbial genetics is that conditions
that kill most, but not all, of a bacterial
population foster the development of resistance.
This is supported by recent studies that suggest
that bacterial stress responses may select for
hypermutability (7,8). While these findings do
not mean that organic acids should not be used as
a tool for controlling foodborne pathogens, they
suggest that proactive research should be
conducted to find ways of using these agents that
minimize the potential for resistance. Proactive
research, including research that might appear
unrelated to the emergence of foodborne
pathogens, can draw on the already substantial
body of basic research related to the conditions
and requirements for gene transfer among
biologic agents. For example, Baur et al. (9)
reported on the conditions that led to the
competence of Escherichia coli for genetic
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Maximal competence occurred when the bacte-
rium was exposed to  2 mM Ca2+ as temperatures
increased from 10°C to 20°C. With such
information, researchers could examine food
processing operations to determine the presence
and importance of such conditions. For example,
fruits and vegetables are often treated with
calcium under fluctuating temperatures to
enhance the texture during later processing.
A key to being more proactive in addressing the
threat of microbial foodborne pathogens—consider-
ation of root causes—will likely require food
microbiologists to become involved in nontradi-
tional research areas. If new biologic agents arise as
the result of changes in technology, society, or
global economics, predicting and preventing
emergence will ultimately require better under-
standing of how such factors influence pathogen
introduction and dissemination.
Conclusions
One of the critical lessons of the past 10 years
is that we cannot become complacent about
infectious diseases (1). Only a few diseases (e.g.,
smallpox) have actually been eliminated. The
rest, including virtually all foodborne diseases,
we hold in check, winning battles but not the war.
Eventually, our weapons (e.g., antibiotics)
become obsolete; pathogens (e.g., E. coli) become
more dangerous; or we become complacent.
Contingency planning must be developed and
undertaken with a long-term commitment.
Without that commitment and without under-
standing that planning is successful when
problems are avoided or minimized, programs of
this type lapse quickly. In the long term, the costs
of planning, both in terms of economics and
human suffering, are a fraction of those
incurred as the result of the emergence of a
major microbial threat.
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